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This is a draft of a paper due to appear in The Aim of Belief, a collection of 
papers edited by Timothy Chan. Please refer to the published version. 
 
1  Introduction 
The following has the appearance of a platitude: 
  (C)    One correctly believes that p if and only if it is true that p 
This seems equivalent to, or at least to imply:
1 
  (T)    One may believe that p if and only if it is true that p
2 
Evidently, (T) breaks down into the following conditionals: 
  (T-NEC)  One may believe that p only if it is true that p 
  (T-SUFF)  One may believe that p if it is true that p 
Call the view that truth provides the standard for believing, the truth view.
3 
  A principle that appears to be a platitude might, of course, turn out to be false, 
at least if taken at face value. In recent years, the idea that knowledge, rather than 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Timothy Chan and, especially, Conor McHugh for comments on earlier versions of 
this paper, to Jonathan Way for conversations on the issues it concerns, and to the Philosophy 
Department and the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Southampton for supporting a period of 
research leave during which I worked on this material. 
1 For defence of the claim that statements about what it is (in)correct to do imply statements about what 
one may (not) do, see Whiting 2010: §3, though little in what follows hangs on that claim. 
Some deny either that there is a general standard for believing of any sort or that the standard 
for believing has normative import. Such views are not my present concern. 
2 Note that here, and in all formulations of the norms that follows, ‘may’ should be understood as 
having narrow scope. Note also that in what follows I am concerned only with outright belief, not 
degrees of belief or confidence. 
3 I defend the truth view in Whiting 2010. Other proponents include Baldwin (2007), Boghossian (2005: 
ch. 4), Gibbard (2005), Littlejohn (2010), Lynch (2004), Millar (2009), Shah and Velleman (2005), and 
Wedgwood (2002), though they differ in how they formulate the norm of truth.   2 
truth, provides the standard for believing has grown in popularity and prominence. 
Call this, the knowledge view. According to it, the following principle holds: 
  (K)  One may believe that p if and only if one knows that p 
Evidently, (K) breaks down into the following conditionals: 
  (K-NEC)  One may believe that p only if one knows that p 
  (K-SUFF)  One may believe that p if one knows that p
4 
No doubt there are other candidate norms for belief, such as: 
(J)  One may believe that p if and only if one has justification for believing 
that p 
However, the proponent of the knowledge view might consider (J) a variant of (K) (cf. 
Sutton 2007) and, if justification falls short of knowledge, a proponent of either the 
truth view or the knowledge view might consider (J) as in some way derived from (T) 
or (K). Whatever its relationship to other candidate norms governing belief, I shall for 
the most part set (J) aside and focus instead on the disagreement between proponents 
of the truth view and of the knowledge view. Specifically, I shall defend the truth 
view against the various arguments which have been put forward in the recent 
literature which seem to speak against it and in favour of the knowledge view. 
  Some might reject (T) immediately on the grounds that whether or not one 
may believe that p does not depend on the truth of that belief—a matter which is, so to 
speak, out of one’s hands—but only on what else one believes (to leave the alternative 
deliberately vague). Other than to note that the suggestion that one might derive (J) 
from (T) goes some way to speaking to this worry, I shall not address this point, since, 
                                                 
4 Adler (2002), Bach (2008), Bird (2007: 93-95), Engel (2005: 89-90), Huemer (2007), Sutton (2007) 
and Williamson (2000: 11) endorse (K-NEC). Bird (2007: 93-95) and Williamson (2005b: 108) appear 
also to endorse (K-SUFF). It is perhaps surprising that explicit endorsements of (K-SUFF) are less 
frequent—if one knows that p, it is hard to imagine what reason there could be not to believe that p. 
  Smithies (Forthcoming) defends a version of (K) formulated in terms of being in a position to 
know that p.   3 
again, my concern is the dispute between advocates of the truth view and of the 
knowledge view. Both agree that whether or not it is true that p determines (in part or 
in whole) whether or not one may believe that p.  
Since knowing that p entails that p, the proponent of the truth view has no 
reason to deny (K-SUFF). Since knowing that p is incompatible with its being false 
that p, the proponent of the knowledge view has no reason to deny (T-NEC). 
Accordingly, I shall focus on attempts to argue against (T-SUFF) and in favour of (K-
NEC). Although those attempts are due to some of the most prominent contemporary 
philosophers, and although they challenge a deeply entrenched conviction, namely, 
that truth and falsity are the primary dimensions of assessment for belief, the 
knowledge view has so far received almost no critical assessment and almost no 
attempt has been made to defend the truth view in the face of it.
5 
  If there are general normative principles governing belief, then one might 
expect having a clear conception of what those norms are to inform and constrain 
theories of the nature of belief. Likewise, if the notions of truth or knowledge figure 
in the relevant normative principles, then one might expect that fact to inform and 
constrain theories of the nature of truth or of knowledge. Though they provide some 
indication of the importance of the task at hand, I shall not explore such issues in the 
present paper, sticking instead to the prior issue of what the relevant principles are. 
 
2  An objection to the knowledge view 
The knowledge view appears to conflict with the ways in which we criticise and 
evaluate beliefs. Suppose David asks, ‘Who do you believe will win the next 
                                                 
5 In stark contrast to the voluminous literature evaluating the knowledge view of assertion. A notable 
exception, indeed, the only one I am aware of, is Littlejohn 2010. Several of the arguments I examine 
are not arguments Littlejohn considers and, where there is an overlap in focus, my arguments differ 
substantially from his. Nonetheless, our respective discussions are complementary.   4 
election?’ Kelly might reply, ‘The Republicans’.
6 It would be very odd for David to 
reply, ‘You don’t know that!’ And it would be entirely appropriate for Kelly to reject 
this challenge by saying, ‘I never said that I did—I was only telling you what I 
believe’. Note that David might be right that Kelly does not know this but, still, his 
remark seems out of order. 
  In contrast, it would not be odd for David to respond, as one might expect if (T) 
holds, ‘You’re wrong—the Democrats will win’. Likewise, it would not be odd for 
David to respond, as one might expect if (J) holds, ‘You’ve no reason to think that!’ 
Of course, both challenges might fail—if it turns out that Kelly’s belief is true or 
adequately supported by reasons—but the important point is that remarks of this sort 
do not in general seem out of order. Kelly cannot dismiss challenges concerning her 
belief’s truth-value or its justificatory status as she can those concerning her 
possession, or otherwise, of knowledge. 
  These observations suggest that the knowledge view is mistaken—it is not the 
case that one may believe that p only if one knows that p. Of course, this is not 
decisive and there might be ways in which proponents of the knowledge view might 
seek to reject the observations or show that, despite appearances, they are consistent 
with her position. Rather than pursue the matter further, I shall turn to the arguments 
which have been offered in support of (K-NEC). If those arguments are unsuccessful, 
the attempt to deal with the above objection lacks motivation. To anticipate, I shall 
claim, not only that the arguments are unsuccessful, but that some of the 
considerations they appeal to turn out, on reflection, to count against the knowledge 
view. 
                                                 
6 Note that, in this context, Kelly’s utterance should not be heard as a flat-out assertion that the 
Republicans will win the next election. Given the question to which she is responding, it is clear that 
Kelly is only expressing her belief. I shall consider the relation between belief and assertion in the next 
section.   5 
 
3  Arguments for the knowledge view of assertion 
A common strategy is to argue for the knowledge view of belief by appeal to the 
knowledge view of assertion. Suppose that one may assert that p only if one knows 
that p. Suppose also that, given a ‘far-reaching parallel between belief and assertion’ 
(Adler 2002: 13), one can read off the norms of belief from those governing assertion. 
(K-NEC) would seem to follow.
7 This strategy has the benefit of freeing proponents of 
the knowledge view of belief from having to argue directly in favour of (K-NEC). 
Whatever considerations support the knowledge view of assertion support in turn the 
knowledge view of belief. 
  The first difficulty the strategy faces is that the knowledge view of assertion is 
false and the arguments provided in support of it are unsuccessful. There is, however, 
not space here to justify such a bold assessment.
8 Accordingly, I shall set it aside, 
since the strategy faces other problems.  
  As noted above, the attempt to read norms of belief directly off those 
governing assertion assumes that belief and assertion are in some way internal and 
external counterparts. This assumption is false. Believing is a state whereas asserting 
is an action. In turn, actions are usually considered to be either events or processes. If 
assertion, so understood, has an internal counterpart, then it is judgement, not belief. 
At most, then, one can infer the norms of judging from those governing asserting. It is 
a further step, one which might stand in need of justification, to infer the norms of 
believing from those governing judging. That said, perhaps, as Bird suggests (2007: 
                                                 
7 For this strategy, see Adler 2002: 36; Bird 2007: 95ff; Sutton 2007: 44-48; Williamson 2000: 10, 238, 
255-256. 
8 For a critique of the knowledge view of assertion, see Whiting Manuscript. The arguments I provide 
there would equally provide a response to the arguments I survey here in support of the knowledge 
view of belief. Nonetheless, I shall not rely on them. 
For other critiques of the knowledge view of assertion, see Brown 2008b; Brown 2010; 
Lackey 2007; Lackey 201l; Levin 2008.   6 
96), it would ‘odd’ if the standards to which judgement is subject were different from 
those to which belief is subject, especially, one might add, since judgement typically 
issues in belief. 
  If one allows that belief is the internal counterpart of assertion, and grants that 
knowledge is the norm of assertion, a further difficulty facing the strategy under 
consideration is that there is no obvious reason to expect the norms governing belief 
to be identical to those governing assertion; indeed, there is some reason to think that 
they differ and, in particular, that the former are more demanding than the latter.  
  Precisely because asserting is ‘external’, rather than ‘internal’, it is, if not 
necessarily a social act, then necessarily a potentially social act. As a result, in 
evaluating an assertion, one might have to take into account the effect it might have 
on others, the expectations and needs of one’s interlocutors, the part that speech act 
might play in the unfolding conversation, and so on. Evidently, all these 
considerations are foreign to the assessment of belief. Most significantly perhaps, 
assertion, unlike belief, is a potential source of testimony and is liable to be treated as 
such. Hence, in asserting, one takes on responsibility for others’ beliefs, in addition to 
one’s own.
9 In light of these observations, it should come as no surprise that a 
situation in which one may believe that p might not be a situation in which one may 
assert that p. Just as what one can get away with in the privacy of one’s own home 
differs from what one can get away with on the street, so what one can get away with 
when believing differs from what one can get away with when one expresses one’s 
belief in asserting. 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, Reynolds (2002) appeals to the idea that assertion is a source of testimony in support of 
the knowledge view of assertion. 
  Cf. Williamson’s suggestion that ‘to make an assertion is to confer a responsibility (on oneself) 
for the truth of its content’ (2000: 268). Nothing like this seems to be involved in believing. Cf. also 
Adler’s claim that ‘Our responsibilities rise when we assert beliefs to others, placing demands on their 
time and effort, while recommending that others accept and act on them’ (2002: 82).   7 
  None of these points demonstrate conclusively that one cannot show that (K-
NEC) holds of believing because a similar principle holds of asserting. They do, 
however, suggest that there is no easy route from the norms governing assertion to 
those governing belief. Rather than pursue this matter further, I shall explore whether 
one can appeal directly to considerations analogous to those which motivate the 
knowledge view of assertion in support of the knowledge view of belief. The most 
prominent ways in which philosophers try to argue for the former are by attending to 
so-called Moorean assertions (see Adler 2002: 36; Sutton 2007: 44; Unger 1975: 256; 
Williamson 2000: 253-254) and by reflecting on cases involving so-called lottery 
assertions (see Sutton 2007: 44; Unger 1975: 261; Williamson 2000: 244-249). I shall 
consider each, adapted to belief, in turn. 
 
3.1  Moorean beliefs 
Suppose Elliot asserts: 
(1)  Dogs bark, but I don’t know that dogs bark. 
What Elliot asserts is consistent and might be true. Nonetheless, his assertion seems 
absurd. He should not assert (1). Suppose that it would be equally absurd to believe 
(1), and so he should not do so. It is not clear how the truth view could explain this.
10 
In contrast, an explanation is readily available to the proponent of (K-NEC). In 
believing (1), Elliot adopts an attitude subject to a certain norm, namely, (K-NEC), but, 
given what he believes, Elliot’s attitude cannot possibly satisfy that norm. Elliot may 
believe the first conjunct only if he knows that dogs bark; in which case, the second 
conjunct is false and he may not believe it. Conversely, Elliot may believe the second 
                                                 
10 Baldwin (2007) and Millar (2009: 148-149) appeal to some version of the truth view in accounting 
for the absurdity of believing that I believe that p, but not-p or that p, but I believe that not-p. However, 
neither Baldwin nor Millar tackle belief in propositions such as (1).   8 
conjunct only if he knows that he doesn’t know that dogs bark, which entails that he 
doesn’t know that dogs bark; in which case, he may not believe the first conjunct. 
  While it is clear that one should not assert (1), it is far from obvious that one 
should not believe it or that doing so involves the same kind of absurdity.
11 On the 
contrary, realising that some of one’s beliefs do not qualify as knowledge seems to me 
an important component of intellectual honesty or cognitive integrity. (There is, of 
course, a difference between believing that one has beliefs which fall short of 
knowledge and believing of a particular belief that it does so.) 
Experience suggests that intuitions on this matter can go either way. What 
clouds the issue is that it is very hard, if not impossible, not to hear (1) as asserted. 
This makes it correspondingly difficult to keep apart our judgements as to whether (1) 
may be asserted and our judgements as to whether it may be believed. 
In view of this, it is instructive to compare (1) with the following: 
(2)  I believe that dogs bark, but I don’t know that dogs bark. 
(3)  I believe that dogs bark, but dogs don’t bark. 
While (3) seems absurd or inappropriate—as one would expect given the truth view 
of belief—(2) does not—as one should expect given the knowledge view of belief. 
The proponent of (K-NEC) might question the significance of this. It is 
common to suggest that sentences of the form ‘I believe that p’ typically serve, not to 
express or attribute the belief that p, but to make hedged assertions, or to express or 
attribute the belief that it is probable that p (cf. Adler 2002: 11; Sutton 2007: 64). 
Hence, whether or not (2) seems inappropriate is no guide as to whether or not (1) is. 
  Interestingly, the truth view provides a straightforward explanation, not 
available to the proponent of the knowledge view, of why asserting that I believe that 
                                                 
11 Littlejohn (2010: §§3-4) accepts that there is something wrong with believing propositions such as (1) 
and tries to account for this consistently with the truth view.   9 
p should be more cautious than simply asserting that p. Suppose that knowledge is the 
norm of assertion. In asserting that p, I commit myself in some sense to knowing that 
p, while in asserting that I believe that p, I do not; I commit myself only to knowing 
that I believe that p. However, if knowledge is the norm of belief, then I would remain 
(indirectly) committed to knowing that p. Alternatively, if truth is the norm of belief, I 
am (indirectly) committed only to its being true that p. If these, admittedly speculative, 
remarks are correct, then the fact that assertions of (2) are more cautious than 
assertions of (1) supports the truth view. 
  Be that as it may, consider: 
(4)  I fully/really/genuinely believe that dogs bark, but I don’t know that 
dogs bark. 
Evidently, this is neither hedged nor cautious; in thinking or asserting (4) I attribute to 
myself the outright belief that dogs bark, while denying that this belief counts as 
knowledge. (4) does not seem inappropriate. This is not what one would expect if 
believing were governed by (K-NEC). Thus, we have reason to doubt that it is. 
Moreover, if (4) is not inappropriate, then surely (1) is not, considered as believed not 
asserted. 
  A proponent of the knowledge view might continue to insist that, the above 
attempt to show otherwise notwithstanding, (1), considered as believed, is 
inappropriate or absurd. In that case, there is a clash of intuitions. How might progress 
be made? 
  Huemer (2007) motivates (K-NEC) by appeal to allegedly Moorean beliefs 
such as (1), and in turn seeks to account for the norm by appeal to two principles. It 
would be productive to consider whether one can motivate (K-NEC) directly by appeal   10 
to those principles, and so bypass reliance on mere intuitions concerning apparently 
Moorean beliefs. 
  According to Huemer (2007: 148), the following principle of ‘metacoherence’ 
seems plausible: 
(MC)  Consciously believing that p commits one, on reflection, to 
comprehensively, epistemically endorsing one’s belief that p. 
Endorsing one’s belief in the relevant respect is a matter of making a second-order 
judgement which positively (epistemically) evaluates the first-order belief.  
Huemer (2007: 148) adds to this the following ‘endorsement theory of 
knowledge’: 
(EK)  Knowledge attribution is the most comprehensive epistemic 
endorsement. 
(MC) and (EK), Huemer claims, together imply (K-NEC). 
  An immediate reason to doubt this is that (MC) is restricted to conscious belief. 
Thus, at most, (MC), together with (EK), could support a version of (K-NEC) 
restricted to conscious belief, whereas proponents of the knowledge view intend to 
offer an account of the norms governing belief generally, conscious or otherwise. 
  Perhaps this is not a serious concern—Huemer might simply drop the 
restriction to conscious belief without affecting the plausibility of the principle. A 
related, but distinct, problem is that, according to (MC), one is normatively committed 
to comprehensively, epistemically endorsing one’s belief when one reflects on it. So, 
one way to ensure one does not violate the commitment expressed by (MC) would be 
to ensure one does not reflect on one’s beliefs. So, at most, (MC), together with (EK), 
could support the following:   11 
(K-NEC*)  One may believe that p only if (one knows that p or one does 
not reflect on one’s belief that p) 
This principle is implausible. Surely, whatever norm governs belief, it should not 
actively discourage reflection on one’s beliefs and their epistemic credentials. In any 
event, whatever is to be said for it, (K-NEC*) does not look like what proponents of 
the knowledge view are after. 
  Setting this aside, the attempt to appeal to Huemer’s principles in support of 
the knowledge view faces another difficulty. (MC) and (EK) suggest that, if one 
believes that p, one is committed to taking one’s belief to amount to knowledge. Of 
course, one’s taking one’s belief to qualify as knowledge is consistent with its actually 
falling short of knowledge. In light of this, it seems that (MC) and (EK) could at most 
support: 
(K-NEC**)  One may believe that p only if one takes oneself to know that p 
Again, whatever is to be said for this principle, it is not what proponents of the 
knowledge view intend to advance. 
  Surely, one might reply, one should not take oneself to know if one does not 
know. This is true—indeed, it is precisely the verdict (T) delivers—but nothing in 
(MC) and (EK) deliver that thought. 
  Setting this aside, it is worth considering more carefully what Huemer means 
by a ‘comprehensive, epistemic endorsement’.  According to Huemer, to endorse a 
belief, in this sense, is to judge that there is no sufficient reason not to hold it. 
Correlatively, to reject or not to endorse one’s belief is to judge that ‘one ought not to’ 
hold it (2007: 149-150). In view of this, (EK) amounts to the thesis that to judge that 
one’s belief constitutes knowledge is to judge that one may hold it, and to judge that 
one’s belief falls short of knowledge is to judge that one may not hold it. Thus, once   12 
one spells out Huemer’s notion of a comprehensive epistemic endorsement, it appears 
that (EK) just is (K-NEC), or a reformulation of it. Hence, it evidently cannot be used, 
in conjunction with (MC) or otherwise, to provide independent support for the 
knowledge view. 
 
3.2  Lotteries 
Suppose that Stanley has a ticket in a lottery. The chances of winning the lottery are, 
as Stanley is aware, 1/1000,000. Stanley has yet to hear the results of the lottery, 
which was drawn earlier in the day. He asserts flat-out: 
  (5)  My ticket didn’t win. 
Assume that (5) is true. Despite this, and despite the extremely strong probabilistic 
grounds in support of (5), intuitively, Stanley should not assert this. Instead, he should 
only conjecture that his ticket didn’t win, or assert that his ticket probably lost. 
  Should it turn out that, intuitively, just as Stanley should not assert (5), he 
should not believe it, it is hard to see how the truth view could explain this, even if 
one grants that (T) generates some version of (J). In contrast, if (K-NEC) holds, and if 
Stanley cannot know the lottery proposition, as seems plausible, the knowledge view 
could easily account for the impropriety of his belief. 
  This argument against the truth view is too swift. Suppose that (T-NEC) 
generates a subsidiary norm, according to which one may believe that p only on 
grounds which could not easily lead one to believe falsely. If such a norm holds, this 
would explain why it is wrong for Stanley to believe (5). Although the odds of the 
ticket’s having lost are extremely high, one could easily believe falsely if one were to 
believe (5) on that basis alone.    13 
Having registered it, I shall not pursue this strategy any further. Later (§5), I 
shall have a lot more to say about attempts to derive such a justification norm from 
the truth norm. 
The above argument is too swift in another respect. Unfortunately for the 
proponent of the knowledge view, intuitions with respect to believing (5) do not seem 
to match up to intuitions with respect to asserting it. At the very least, those intuitions 
are less strong in the former case than in the latter. Whether or not one thinks that 
Stanley should believe the lottery proposition, given the overwhelming likelihood that 
it is true—indeed, given that it is true—it certainly seems as if he may do so. It would 
surely be wrong or excessive to say that Stanley may not believe that his ticket didn’t 
win. 
  At worst, then, reflection on lottery beliefs counts against (K-NEC). At best, 
there is a standoff of intuitions; in which case, there is as yet no reason to relinquish 
the truth view.
 12 The proponent of the knowledge view needs to provide a principled 
reason to think that subjects like Stanley should not believe lottery propositions like 
(5).
13 
                                                 
12 For a rather different response to lottery cases, which accepts, with the knowledge view, that one 
should not believe a lottery proposition and tries to explain this away consistently with the truth view, 
see Littlejohn 2010: §2. 
13 Sutton (2007: 48-53; cf. Smithies Forthcoming: §5) provides a more elaborate argument for (K-NEC) 
by appeal to lottery propositions. Consider: 
(i)  One can justifiably believe that ticket
1 didn’t win.  
(ii)  If one can justifiably believe that ticket
1didn’t win, one can justifiably believe that 
ticket
2 didn’t win and one can justifiably that ticket
3 didn’t win and … one can 
justifiably believe that ticket
1,000,000 didn’t win.  
(iii)  So, one can justifiably believe that ticket
1 didn’t win and ticket
3 didn’t win and … 
ticket
1,000,000 didn’t win.  
Since (iii) is absurd, Sutton claims, we must reject the initial assumption (i). One cannot justifiably 
believe that ticket
1 didn’t win (and so one may not believe this), even though the probability that it is 
true is extremely high, indeed, even if it is true. Since one also cannot know that ticket
1 didn’t win, this 
seems to point towards (K-NEC). 
  Though a full discussion of this issue is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth 
noting some reasons to doubt that this argument undermines the truth view and motivates the 
knowledge view. First, (iii) is not absurd, unless one adds (as Sutton does) that the subject knows that 
one ticket will win. Thus, at most, the argument shows that one may not believe that a ticket will lose 
when one knows that some ticket will win. Thus, it fails to show that generally one may not believe 
that a ticket didn’t win in cases where that belief is true and/or highly probable on one’s evidence.   14 
  At this point, a defender of (K-NEC) might introduce the following additional 
considerations (cf. Smithies Forthcoming: §5). Assume that Stanley may believe (5) 
(because it is true, and perhaps also because it is highly probable on his evidence). 
Were Stanley to form this belief, he might act on it and throw his ticket away. 
However, other things being equal, Stanley should not throw his ticket away on the 
basis of his belief alone. And, surely, if it is wrong to act on a certain belief, one 
should not have that belief. Thus, the initial assumption is false. Moreover, the 
argument continues, were Stanley to know (5), then, other things being equal, it 
would not be wrong for him to throw his ticket away on the basis of that knowledge.
14 
If one grants that the reason Stanley should not act on his lottery belief is that 
he does not know it, this at most shows that knowledge is the norm of practical 
reasoning: one should not rely on the proposition that p in one’s practical reasoning, if 
one does not know that p.
15 If this is correct, it is consistent with the truth view. One 
may believe that p, even if one does not know that p, so long as one does not rely on 
what one believes in one’s practical reasoning. 
One might reply that it is surely in some sense belief’s job or aim to provide 
premises for practical reasoning (cf. Bird 2007: 94); in which case, a belief one may 
not act on or reason from is not doing its job; in which case, in turn, one should not 
                                                                                                                                            
Second, even if, with Sutton, one rejects the initial assumption, this might not lead straight to 
(K-NEC). If one is not justified in believing on merely probabilistic grounds that p, and so should not do 
so, there might be grounds of a different sort which are not knowledge-affording and on which one 
might be justified in believing that p, and so on which one may do so (see Nelkin 2000). 
Finally, one might deny that the argument is valid. The move to (iii) assumes that justification 
is closed under conjunction. Arguably, if one is justified in believing that p and justified in believing 
that q, it does not follow that one is justified in believing that p and q (see Foley 1979; Klein 1995; 
Kyburg 1961). Whether or not justification is closed under conjunction, the present focus is on 
candidate norms of belief formulated in terms of what one may or may not believe; it is certainly false 
that, if one may φ and one may ψ, one may φ and ψ (see Whiting 2010: §5). 
14 A line of thought like this seems to lie behind Sutton’s ‘modesty’ argument (2007: 53-57), which 
aims to show that one should not hold lottery beliefs. 
  Note that Sutton’s ‘posterior evaluation’ argument (2007: 57-59) cannot be used to reject the 
truth view, since it allows that there are cases in which one may form a true belief—indeed, in which 
one should do so!—despite lacking the relevant knowledge. 
15 For defence of a version of this principle, see Hawthorne and Stanley 2008. For criticisms, see 
Brown 2008a; Hill and Schechter 2007; Levin 2008; Neta 2009.   15 
have such a belief. This suggests that one cannot keep apart, in the way I suggested, 
the norms of belief and of practical reasoning.  
Waters run deep here. I shall postpone discussion of belief’s aim until later 
(§5). And it is beyond the scope of the present paper to explore fully the nature of 
practical reasoning or to settle decisively debates concerning the norms governing it. 
For now, I shall point to some considerations which at least suggest that reflection on 
lottery beliefs and reasoning about what to do involving them does not 
straightforwardly undermine the truth view of belief or support the knowledge view. 
Note first that, given what he believes, there is a clear sense in which it would 
not be wrong for Stanley to throw his ticket away. Ex hypothesi his belief is true; 
hence, it is a fact that his ticket lost; and this fact speaks in favour of, or at least does 
not speak against, throwing the ticket away. If Stanley does so, he does not act 
wrongly, that is, he does not do what there is reason not to do. 
  In this way, a proponent of the truth view can respect the intuitive link 
between belief and action, or the idea that it is the function of belief to provide the 
grounds for action. That is, if it is a constraint on belief that what one believes be a 
reason or warrant for acting, then the relevant lottery belief meets that constraint. 
  No doubt an opponent of the truth view will point out that what is denied is 
not that, given what Stanley (truly) believes, he may throw the ticket away; what is 
denied is rather that Stanley may reason from what he believes to throwing the ticket 
away (or deciding to do so). Fair enough. But it is important to keep in view what this 
example shows. Contrary to my earlier concession, it does not show that one may act 
on the basis of or reason from one’s belief only if it qualifies as knowledge (and so, in 
turn, that one may hold that belief only if it qualifies as knowledge). First, there might 
be other explanations as to what is wrong with the relevant reasoning than that   16 
Stanley does not know that his ticket lost.
16 Second, it has not been shown that it is 
never okay to reason from or act on beliefs which fall short of knowledge. Suppose, 
for example, that Stanley decides on the basis of his (true) belief that his ticket didn’t 
win not to quit his poorly paid and unrewarding job (though the opportunity to do so 
presents itself). There is nothing manifestly wrong with this reasoning. So, if one may 
have a certain belief only if one may reason from or act on that belief, Stanley’s 
lottery belief seems to pass that test. 
Admittedly, the truth view’s advocate owes an account of why it appears that a 
subject like Stanley may perform certain actions or make certain decisions on the 
basis of a true lottery belief but not others (such as throwing away the ticket). But 
equally the knowledge view’s advocate owes an account of why it appears that a 
subject like Stanley may perform certain actions or make certain decisions on the 
basis of a true lottery belief which falls short of knowledge (such as sticking with his 
job). As far as explanatory obligations go, they are on all fours. 
Moreover, whatever one’s views concerning the norms of belief, there is some 
reason to expect that the standards for belief and for practical reasoning can diverge, 
that is, that a belief one may have might not always be a belief one may act on.
17 It is 
plausible to think, consistently with both the truth and knowledge views of belief, that 
the propriety of holding a certain belief is determined solely by whether or not that 
belief is true and/or its epistemic status, i.e. by epistemic considerations. Alternatively, 
practical considerations are irrelevant to whether or not one may believe that p.
18 (Of 
                                                 
16 For some such alternatives, see Hill and Schechter 2007; Levin 2008; Neta 2009. 
17 Interestingly, a prominent proponent of the knowledge view of belief, namely, Williamson (2005a: 
§5), allows that there might be situations in which it is appropriate for a subject to rely on the 
proposition that p in practical reasoning—since she knows that p—but in which, given the stakes, one 
might criticise the agent or judge her reasoning to be bad were she to do so—since she does not know 
that she knows that p. There is not a big gap between this view and one according to which beliefs one 
may have need not be beliefs one may rely on in practical reasoning. 
18 This thought might be denied by some of those who accept so-called ‘pragmatic encroachment’, 
though that would depend on how exactly the thought is spelled out, as well as on the nature of the   17 
course, such considerations might bear on whether or not one has reason to form a 
belief whether p.) In contrast, it is not at all plausible to think that the propriety of 
acting or deciding on the basis of a given belief is determined solely by epistemic 
considerations. Alternatively, practical considerations can hardly be irrelevant to 
whether or not one’s belief may figure in one’s practical reasoning about what to 
do.
19 
Suppose, to use a stock example, that, having just seen the bank’s opening 
hours posted on its door and having been there on several previous Fridays, one (truly) 
believes that the bank is open on Friday. Intuitively, one may believe this. However, 
whether one may act on this belief by, say, going to the bank on Friday to withdraw 
money might further depend on what is at stake. Intuitively, if the stakes are high—if, 
say, one needs money on Friday to pay the ransom on one’s children and the relevant 
bank is the only one in the vicinity—then one should be certain that the bank is open 
on Friday before acting on the belief (‘I need to make sure…’). In contrast, intuitively, 
if the stakes are low—if, say, some cash would just be handy for purchasing coffee 
and the relevant bank is one of many in the immediate area—then one’s (mere) true 
belief might suffice as a basis on which to act (‘I think it’s open but, if I’m wrong, it’s 
hardly the end of the world…’). Though not decisive, this suggests that the standards 
for practical reasoning vary with the circumstances—in particular, with what is at 
stake—in a way that the standards for belief do not. 
Returning to the case at hand, though Stanley’s belief that his ticket didn’t win 
is true, if Stanley may not throw away his ticket on that basis, this does not threaten 
the truth view of belief, let alone establish the knowledge view. A belief one may 
                                                                                                                                            
relevant encroachment. Even if one thinks that practical considerations play some role in determining 
the epistemic status of a belief, one might not think that the very same practical considerations play a 
role in determining whether one may rely on that belief in one’s practical reasoning. 
19 Brown (2008a) and Levin (2008) defend the view that the standards for practical reasoning are 
determined by the practical circumstances.   18 
have might not always be a belief one may rely on in one’s practical reasoning. Belief, 
one can grant, does its job if and only if it delivers truths (i.e. facts) which constitute 
grounds for action. Whether one may act on those grounds might further depend on 
(practical) considerations, including what is at stake.  
The starting point for this discussion of practical reasoning was the claim that 
intuitions concerning lottery beliefs do not seem to point to (K-NEC) and so away 
from (T-SUFF). Though there is no doubt more to be said about such matters, the 
excursus via the role beliefs play in reasoning about what to do, and the norms 
governing such reasoning, has not yet forced us to discount those intuitions. 
 
4  Cleverly disguised mules and the value of knowledge 
So far, I have argued that one cannot simply read off the norms governing belief from 
those governing assertion and that versions of the arguments standardly offered in 
support of the knowledge view of assertion do not succeed when applied to belief. It 
is worth, then, turning to other considerations, independent of the debate over 
assertion, which proponents of (K-NEC) appeal to in motivating that principle. 
  Williamson (2005b: 109) argues for the knowledge view and against the truth 
view by inviting us to reflect on cases like the following. Holly is at the zoo and sees 
what appears to be a zebra in a cage. Unbeknownst to Holly, what she sees is in fact a 
cleverly disguised mule. Given this, Williamson says, it is ‘wrong’ for Holly to 
believe that it is a zebra. Of course, Williamson notes, Holly’s evidence makes it 
highly probable that her belief is true. However, he continues, this at best provides   19 
Holly with an excuse.
20 Thus, Williamson concludes, since Holly needs an excuse for 
falsely believing that it is a zebra, her doing so must be wrong. 
  All this is, of course, consistent with the truth view. But Williamson goes on 
to consider another sort of case which might be thought to undermine it. Fred is at the 
zoo and sees what appears to be a zebra. It is in fact a zebra, and so Fred’s belief that 
it is a zebra is true (and, indeed, justified). However, the enclosure is full of cleverly 
disguised mules and it is sheer luck that Fred saw the only genuine zebra. Due to the 
luck, Fred does not know that it is a zebra. According to Williamson, ‘Given that he 
does not in fact know that it is a zebra, he still seems to need some excuse for 
believing that it is a zebra, in which case it is wrong for him to believe that it is a 
zebra’ (2005b: 109). If this is right, it points to (K-NEC). 
  This is, at best, inconclusive. At worst, reflection on this scenario counts 
against, not for, the knowledge view. In contrast to Holly, it is simply not clear that 
Fred is in any need of an excuse and, by the same token, that Fred is wrong to believe 
what he does. Compare the two cases from the perspective of a third-party. Aware 
that Holly’s belief is false, despite being justified, one might be inclined to correct her 
belief and, other things being equal, it would be appropriate to do so. But aware that 
Fred’s belief falls short of knowledge, despite being true and justified, one would 
surely not be inclined to correct his belief and it would not be appropriate to do so—
indeed, there is nothing to correct!  
The extent to which one has the impression that Fred stands in need of 
correction, one might add, might be due to the thought that he probably has false 
background beliefs (for example, that this is zebra territory). 
                                                 
20 Indeed, Williamson adds, it is a poor excuse, since having such evidence is consistent with being in a 
position to know that one does not know (as in lottery cases).   20 
  Williamson might reply as follows. Surely, if given the choice, Fred would 
prefer to know that it is a zebra than merely to believe this truly and justifiably. The 
underlying thought behind this reply is that knowledge is valuable, or at least better 
than anything which falls short of it. If so, it might seem to follow that one should not 
believe that p if one does not know that p. This thought is explicit in Bird’s defence of 
the knowledge view. According to Bird, ‘it is better for an agent to have knowledge 
than true belief’. In turn, he takes this to show that ‘anything short of knowledge is a 
failure’ (2007: 95).  
  Appealing to the idea that knowledge is more valuable than true belief does 
not support Williamson’s assessment of Fred’s situation above, and so does not 
support (K-NEC). First, it is notoriously difficult to show that knowledge is better than 
anything that falls short of it and there is reason to doubt that it is.
21  
Second, even if it could be shown that knowledge is better than mere true 
belief, justified or otherwise, appealing to that point might prove too much. It is as 
plausible to think that reflective knowledge— knowledge that comes with knowing 
that one knows—is better than unreflective knowledge (cf. Millar 2010: ch. 8), or that 
understanding is better than mere knowledge (cf. Kvanvig 2003: ch. 8; Pritchard 2010: 
ch. 4). Following Bird’s reasoning, one would have to conclude that one may believe 
that p only if one knows that one knows that p, or only if one understands why it is the 
case that p. These claims are implausible—the norms are obviously too demanding—
and it is very unlikely that a proponent of the knowledge view would want to endorse 
them. (Both are consistent with (K-NEC) but not with (K-SUFF).) 
  Even if one grants that knowledge is better than that which falls short of it, (K-
NEC) does not follow (at least, without further ado). In general, the fact that φing is 
                                                 
21 For discussion, see Kvanvig 2003 (which includes a critique of Williamson’s account of the value of 
knowledge, which Bird defers to); Pritchard 2010.   21 
better than ψing does not seem to entail that one should not ψ or that it would be 
wrong to ψ. Recall that the fact that φing is better than ψing is consistent with its 
being the case that there is some value in ψing or some reason to ψ. More importantly, 
the fact that φing is better than ψing is consistent with there being no disvalue in ψing 
and so no reason not to ψ. Returning to the case at hand, from the fact that knowledge 
is better than true belief, if it is a fact, it does not follow that it would be wrong to 
have a (mere) true belief or that one should not have such a belief. For this reason, in 
addition to those discussed above, reflection on the value of knowledge vis-à-vis that 
which falls short of it does not undermine the truth view or support (K-NEC). 
 
5  The aim of belief 
An alternative route to (K-NEC) is via the idea that belief has a constitutive aim. If that 
aim is suitably connected to knowledge, then one might take (K-NEC) to follow.
22 
  On some views (e.g. Wedgwood 2002), talk of the aim of belief is just a 
(darker) way of talking about the norm of belief. Evidently, if belief’s aim is 
understood in this way, one cannot invoke it to settle disputes concerning belief’s 
governing norms. Accordingly, I shall focus on so-called ‘teleological’ views, 
according to which one can explain the norm of belief by reference to its 
independently specifiable aim. 
  It is not at all obvious how to understand the claim that belief aims at 
knowledge. For present purposes, I shall assume that, however aim-talk is ultimately 
cashed out, the proponent of the knowledge must hold the following: 
(BAK) The aim of believing that p is satisfied only if one knows that p 
                                                 
22 Adler (2002: 8), Bird (2007: 93), Engel (2005: 89-90), McHugh (2011), Owens (2000: 38), Smithies 
(Forthcoming: §6), Sutton (2007: 23) and Williamson (2000: 11, 47) all claim that ‘belief aims at 
knowledge’. Elsewhere (Whiting Forthcoming), I defend a certain interpretation of the claim that belief 
aims only at the truth.   22 
Given (BAK), perhaps it follows that, on pain of thwarting the aim of doing so, one 
should not believe that p if one does not know that p.
23 
  This might provide an argument for the knowledge view, but only if there is 
some reason to accept the specification of belief’s aim.
24 Typically, proponents of the 
knowledge view defend (BAK) by appeal to the very same arguments, discussed 
above, offered in support of (K-NEC) (cf. Williamson 2000). Since those arguments 
are unsuccessful, or so I have argued, how else might one motivate (BAK)? 
  A common strategy is to start from the thought that belief aims at least at truth 
and to proceed from there to (BAK).
25 Bird, for example, argues as follows: 
If truth were sufficient for the fulfilment of [belief’s] constitutive aim then one could 
have no complaints with someone whose beliefs were true. But clearly this is not 
right. A belief that is merely accidentally true and lacks justification may rightly be 
criticised on that score. (2007: 94) 
This suggests that the aim of believing is satisfied only if one believes truly and with 
justification. What, Bird asks, would explain this? His answer is that the aim of 
believing is satisfied only by knowledge, which entails truth and justification. 
  This argument to the best explanation is unconvincing. First, one might point 
out that, at most, Bird’s reasoning shows that belief’s aim is satisfied only if one’s 
belief is justified and true. What, one might ask, motivates attributing to belief a still 
                                                 
23 Even granting this aim, it is a contentious issue whether (K-NEC) follows. In general, if one aims to φ, 
it does not follow that one has reason to φ or to take the means to φing, or reason not to do anything 
that prevents one from φing. That depends on what the value of φing is. Exploring this issue is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
24 Littlejohn (2010: §3) rejects (BAK) on the grounds that it clashes with (C). While sympathetic to this 
point, I doubt that proponents of the knowledge view will accord it much weight (cp. Smithies 
Forthcoming: §6). It is worth considering how one might motivate (BAK), and so justify the rejection 
of (C). 
25 The only other strategy I am aware of is to argue for (BAK) by appeal to considerations concerning 
the role that evidence plays in motivating belief (this strategy is suggested by Owens (2000: Part I) and 
developed systematically by McHugh (2011). This issue is too large to tackle here, though I hope to do 
so elsewhere.   23 
more demanding aim? Bird, anticipating this, says that ‘it would be odd if the norm 
for belief were the conjunction of two independent factors’ (2007: 94-95). 
In response, a proponent of the truth view might remind us that, as noted at the 
outset, if (T) holds, one would expect it to generate a secondary principle such as (J). 
Likewise, if belief aims only at truth in the relevant sense, this might generate a 
subsidiary aim concerning justification. Thus, truth and justification, though distinct, 
are not independent factors in the relevant sense: that the former is needed to satisfy 
belief’s aim explains why the latter is. Thus, even if one grants Bird’s claim that the 
aim of believing is satisfied only when one’s belief is justified, the proponent of the 
truth view is equally able to explain why this should be so. 
  A different line of thought to Bird’s is as follows.
26 Suppose that the aim of 
believing that p is satisfied only if it is true that p. If a subject has this aim, she cannot 
simply sit around and hope to achieve it; rather, she must adopt a ‘method’ or 
‘purposive means’ to satisfying it (Williams 2005 [1978]: 24; cf. also Wedgwood 
2002: §4). One way to avoid falsity would be to form beliefs only via processes or on 
grounds that are truth-conducive. More specifically, the line of thought continues, if 
one aims to form only true beliefs, one should aim in turn to form only ‘well-
grounded’ beliefs, that is, beliefs based on reasons or brought about in such a way that 
they could not easily be false. This is, of course, a version of the now-familiar attempt 
to generate a justification aim from a truth aim; however, the justification aim the line 
of thought delivers is a particularly demanding one. 
  It appears a short step from here to the knowledge view. If one’s aim in 
believing is satisfied only if one’s belief is true and well-grounded, then one’s aim is 
                                                 
26 The attempt to derive a knowledge aim from the truth aim in the way I consider below originates, to 
my knowledge, in Williams 2005 [1978]: 22-31. Wedgwood (2002) develops the proposal in detail. 
Millar (2009) advances a similar line of thought, though he does not explicitly draw the conclusion that 
belief in some sense aims at knowledge.    24 
to believe safely. And, if one’s aim in believing is satisfied only if one’s belief is safe, 
then it is satisfied only if the belief constitutes knowledge. Given this aim, the line of 
thought concludes, (K-NEC) follows. 
  This attempt to extract (BAK), and so (K-NEC), from the claim that the aim of 
believing that p is satisfied only if it is true that p faces several problems. First, it 
assumes that believing safely that p is sufficient for knowing that p.
27 While many 
(e.g. Williamson 2000) would accept that having a safe belief is necessary for having 
knowledge, it is extremely contentious to suggest that it is enough for knowledge. At 
the very least, then, the proponent of the strategy under consideration has work to do 
in defending the sufficiency claim. 
  Second, recall that the above attempt to extract a knowledge aim from the 
truth aim starts with the seemingly innocent thought that, if one’s aim is to believe 
only the truth, one needs a ‘method’ or ‘means’ of achieving it. Presumably, the 
thought lying in the background here is that often the truth is not directly available or, 
in cases where it is, its being the truth is not transparent. Surely, by the same token, if 
one aims only to have well-grounded beliefs, one needs a ‘method’ or ‘means’ of 
achieving this aim. That one’s belief is, say, based on reasons in such a way that it 
could not easily be false is typically not directly available or transparent. Subjects in 
Gettier-situations, for example, do not have well-grounded beliefs, though this is not 
something subjects in those situations can be aware of. This suggests that, if the aim 
to form only true beliefs generates an aim to form only well-grounded beliefs, this 
will generate in turn a further aim to form beliefs by methods or means that make 
them likely to be well-grounded. What exactly such methods or means are need not 
concern us; what matters is that such methods and means, even when they deliver true 
                                                 
27 This is not the assumption that knowledge admits of a reductive analysis. Our conception of what it 
takes for a belief that p to be safe might derive from our conception of what it is to know that p.   25 
beliefs, are not likely to be knowledge-yielding—after all, they should be available to 
subjects in Gettier-scenarios. So, if one tries to derive further aims from the truth aim, 
is it unclear why that derivation should terminate in an aim concerning well-
groundedness, which together with truth might give us safety and so knowledge, 
rather than some less demanding aim concerning some kind of justification, which 
even with truth does not afford knowledge. 
  To reach a similar conclusion via a different route, suppose one aims only to 
believe the truth. Given this aim, pursuing the above line of thought, one might have a 
subsidiary aim to form only beliefs with justification. But what kind of justification? 
On the one hand, one might aim to have only beliefs which are well-grounded (which, 
with truth, yields knowledge). On the other hand, one might aim to have only beliefs 
that have the kind of support, which includes probabilistic support, available in 
Gettier-situations (which, with truth, does not yield knowledge). In satisfying the 
former subsidiary aim, one would be less reliant on luck in achieving the primary aim 
of avoiding falsehood than one would be in satisfying the latter subsidiary aim, but 
the former subsidiary aim is harder to satisfy the latter. In view of this, one might ask, 
why should we expect the aim to believe only the truth to deliver an aim to have only 
well-grounded beliefs, and so knowledge, rather than the less demanding aim to have 
justified but less-than-well-grounded beliefs? How careful one should be in one’s 
efforts to secure an aim depends on how serious it would be if one failed to meet it. 
Given that having a false belief does not appear very serious (at least, independent of 
its content), it is not clear how, starting from the truth aim alone, one could arrive at   26 
such an exacting aim, one which is satisfied only if one’s belief is well-grounded and 
so in turn, taking the aims together, which is satisfied only if one has knowledge.
28 
  So far, I have challenged the attempt to derive on behalf of the knowledge 
view an aim in believing which is satisfied only if one knows from an aim which is 
satisfied only if one’s belief is true. However, even if the derivation succeeds, the 
attempt to use it to motivate (K-NEC) faces a serious difficulty, precisely because it 
concedes at the outset that the truth aim is fundamental. If one concedes this much, 
one should concede that the knowledge aim gives way, as it were, to the truth aim. 
Alternatively, the truth aim ‘swamps’ the knowledge aim.
29 To appreciate this, 
consider the following. I aim to own only Picassos. Having neither the contacts nor 
the expertise to purchase them directly, I adopt the only effective method or means 
available to me: I hire a purchasing agent to act on my behalf and instruct her 
accordingly. So as to avoid unwittingly purchasing works by Braque or Gris, I aim 
only to purchase works via my agent. On one occasion, I purchase some second-hand 
rolls of canvas, intending to make a tent. On unrolling the canvas, I find I have 
unwittingly purchased a series of lost Picassos. In this case, I have failed to satisfy my 
subsidiary aim only to purchase works via my agent. Nonetheless, I have not failed in 
my primary aim: to own only Picassos. In view of this, that I failed in my subsidiary 
aim is neither here nor there. Equally, it would be wrong to judge that I should sell or 
otherwise disown the Picassos I find myself owning.  
This example points to the following, plausible general principle: if one aims 
to ψ only as a means to satisfying one’s aim to φ, then, if one satisfies one’s aim to φ, 
one has no further reason to ψ or to aim to ψ. 
                                                 
28 This echoes a line of thought in Williamson 2000: 245-247, which seeks to show that the knowledge 
rule for assertion cannot be derived from a truth rule for assertion. 
29 This acknowledges that what follows is akin to the notorious ‘swamping problem’, which seems to 
face any attempt to show that the value of knowledge is instrumental to the value of true belief. For 
discussion, see Kvanvig 2003: ch. 4; Pritchard 2010: ch. 1.   27 
  If, as per the strategy above, one aims to believe only what one knows as a 
means to satisfying one’s aim to believe only the truth, then, if one believes the truth, 
one has no further reason to believe only what one knows or to aim to do so. Hence, 
given the truth aim as primary, in a situation in which one believes the truth, but lacks 
knowledge, one has no further reason to stick to the subsidiary aim and relinquish 
one’s belief. The knowledge aim is swamped by the truth aim. In which case, one 
cannot appeal in the manner explored above to the aim of belief in support of (K-NEC); 
if one aims to believe only what one knows as a means to believing only the truth, 
then, when one has a true belief which falls short of knowledge, it does not follow that 
one should not have that belief.
30 
  The main aim of this paper is to reject the knowledge view and the arguments 
offered in support of it. However, I hope, in doing so, to defend the truth view. 
Accordingly, a possible objection at this point is as follows. Doesn’t the truth view 
face a similar swamping problem? I have granted that, if there is an aim in believing 
which is satisfied only if one’s belief is true, this might generate a subsidiary aim 
which is satisfied only if one’s belief is justified. Surely, by parity of reasoning, the 
latter aim gives way to the former. This might in turn cast doubt on attempts to 
generate (J) from (T).  
  In response, note first that, if there is a problem here, it clearly provides no 
comfort to those seeking to establish (K-NEC). Second, one must recall the dialectical 
                                                 
30 Perhaps there is a different way of thinking about the relation between aiming only at truth and 
aiming only at knowledge. Suppose it is important that one has a true belief as to whether p. In that 
case, one might aim to have knowledge concerning whether p, rather than mere true belief, since 
knowledge that p is rationally immune to being undermined by evidence that not-p. And, if one aims to 
have knowledge concerning whether p, one should believe that p only if one knows that p. (This line of 
thought is inspired by Millar 2010: ch. 8, though Millar’s focus is whether knowledge is valuable, not 
whether it is the aim of belief, and Millar’s conclusion is that what is of value is not mere knowledge 
but reflective knowledge.) 
  This story is plausible but it provides no support for (K-NEC), since it is restricted to cases 
where it matters to the subject whether p. Suppose that it does not matter whether p (it is utterly trivial). 
It is hard to see why it should matter that one’s belief whether p is rationally immune to doubt, and so it 
is hard to see why one should aim to have knowledge whether p.   28 
situation. In the present context, the proponents of the truth view and the knowledge 
view both accept as fundamental the aim only to believe the truth. The issue, then, is 
what subsidiary aims one might derive—an aim only to believe with justification, 
perhaps, or an aim only to believe what one knows. Either way, the truth aim and the 
norms it delivers take precedence over the subsidiary aim and the norms it delivers. 
Hence, if the version of the swamping problem I have advanced is real, the proponent 
of the truth view gets to keep hold of (T) and has to tell a different story about what, if 
anything, generates (J); in contrast, if the problem is real, the proponent of the 
knowledge view gets nothing and has no story to tell at all. 
  The point of the present section is not that one cannot show belief to have an 
aim which is satisfied only by knowledge, from which one might derive (K-NEC). The 
point, rather, is that showing this requires showing the knowledge aim to be 
fundamental, not derivative. That said, it seems likely that any argument which one 
might offer in support of attributing this aim to belief could be used directly to argue 
for (K-NEC), in which case the detour via belief’s aim is something of a distraction. 
 
6  Conclusion 
At the outset, I suggested that it appears to be a platitude that believing that p is 
correct if and only if it is true that p, and so that one may believe that p if and only if 
it is true that p. I think we can continue to take that appearance at face value. While 
some have tried to suggest otherwise, claiming that knowledge provides the standard 
against which belief is measured, the arguments in support of this suggestion are 
unsuccessful. Indeed, several of those arguments appeal to data (concerning, for 
example, lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs and Gettier-scenarios) which, on inspection, 
seem to undermine, rather than favour, the knowledge view. In light of this, and the   29 
initial objection to (K-NEC), it appears, not only that we have no reason to accept the 
knowledge view, but that we have reason to reject it. 
  In closing, it is worth noting that, for all that has been said here, the proponent 
of the knowledge view can have much of what she wants. Knowledge might be the 
norm of assertion (bearing in mind that there is no direct route from the norms 
governing assertion to those governing belief). Knowledge might be the goal of 
enquiry (bearing in mind that not all beliefs are arrived at through or in the service of 
enquiry). Knowledge might be the norm of practical reasoning (bearing in mind that 
not all beliefs are grounds on which one acts). Knowledge might be the norm for 
beliefs which concern matters of importance (bearing in mind that not all beliefs 
concern such matters). One can grant this much while insisting that knowledge, in 
general, is not the norm for belief—truth is (or so I believe). 
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